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ARTICLE� 
An Ecological Argument for Vegetarianism 
1. To the prudential, humanitarian, 
utilitarian, and deontological argu­
ments for vegetarianism, I would like 
to add an ecological argument. 1 I will 
suppose, for the sake of argument, 
that healthy ecosystems are of value, 
that the value of an ecosystem is 
positively related to its degree of 
health, and that at least part of this 
value is independent of the interests 
of human and other sentient beings. 
This is not to deny that human inter­
ests and sentient experiences have 
value, but to affirm that the value of 
a healthy ecosystem does not rest 
entirely upon these other values. 
The following argument is thus 
hypothetical in form. If one accepts 
the independent value of healthy eco­
systems, then one must accept the 
prescription to become a vegetarian. 
The antecedent is controversial. 
Kantians and hedonistic utilitarians 
will not accord the required value to 
ecosystems, whereas W. D. Ross's 
formali.sm and G. E. Moore's idealistic 
util ita ri ani sm are compati ble with th is 
value. Rather than repeat the argu­
ments here, I refer the reader to the 
appropriate literature2 and move on to 
the vegetarian implications of believi ng 
that healthy ecosystems are intrinsi­
cally good. 
The "vegetarian implication" that I 
endorse in the present paper is lim­
ited, but nonetheless of great practi­
cal significance. Except for those 
relatively few people whose health 
would be endangered by vegetarian­
ism, members of industrial societies 
have an absolute duty, as opposed to 
a merely prima facie duty, to adopt a 
diet th at does not incl ude th e meat of 
animals that have' been deliberately 
raised for food, nor of animals 
acq uired th roug h the hunti ng methods 
employed almost universally in indus­
trial societies. This would be a diet 
without MacDonald's hambu rgers, 
without ground meat, or steak or 
chicken or pork from the grocery 
store, without Kentucky Fried 
Chicken, and without pepperoni or 
sausage or ham on one's pizza, to 
mention but a few of the ways in 
which the prescribed diet differs from 
that of most Americans. The implica­
tions of the argument are thus con­
siderable. But the argument falls 
short of prescribing anything at all 
for some people (traditional hunter­
gatherers and those with special 
dietary problems) ,and does not pre­
scribe strict vegetarianism for anyone 
(because strict vegetarianism excludes 
eating even the small quantities of 
fish that may be acquired through 
ecologically benign fishing). In these 
respects, the argument is like the 
utilitarian argument for vegetarianism. 
Yet, as in the case of the utilitarian 
argument, the argument presented 
here prescribes so many dieta ry 
changes in the direction of vegetari­
anism for so many of our society's 
omnivores, that it is not unreasonably 
labeled an argument for vegetarianism. 
2. If healthy ecosystems are of 
value, and the value of an ecosystem 
is positively related to its health, 
then, according to both ethical theo­
ries that are compatible with this 
value, one has a moral reason to avoid 
needlessly impairing the health of any 
ecosystem. To do so is to diminish 
the good, which runs afoul of both 
the formalist duty of nonmaleficence 
and the (ideal) utilitarian duty to 
maximize the good. The same theories 
endorse repairing the damage one has 
done to an ecosystem's health. 
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Formalism includes a duty of repara­
tion, and repairing damage would, all 
other things being equal, maximize the 
good. Further, one ought, when 
possible, to promote or improve the 
health of ecosystems. This accords 
with both the formalist duty of benef­
icence and the utilitarian duty to 
maximize the good. 
However, the val ue of healthy eco­
systems is just one among many val­
ues. So on either eth ical theory, the 
duties to avoid harming, to repair 
damage anq to improve the health of 
ecosystems are only prima facie. 
They apply when all other things are 
equal. 
This may suggest to some people 
that these duties are overridden 
whenever they call for behavior that 
the agent fi nds inconven ient or irk­
some. But such a view ignores the 
distinction between moral and pruden­
tial obligations. A moral obligation is 
affected by and responsive to consid­
erations relating not only to the 
agent, but to at least some other 
beings as well. A purely prudential 
obi igation, by contrast, is affected by 
and responsive to considerations 
relating to the agent alone. The 
slightest inconvenience to the agent 
could override an obligation only if no 
weight is accorded to considerations 
relating to others, which is to say, 
only if the obligation in question is 
prudential rather than moral. Any 
prima facie moral obligation requires 
more, if it is to be overridden, than 
the slightest inconvenience to the 
agent. Since the obligations to 
refrain from har-ming, to repair harm 
done, and to promote the health of 
ecosystems are moral obi igations, they 
cannot be overridden by the slightest 
inconvenience to the agent. 
3. One way that people can 
reduce thei r negative impact upon, 
and promote the health of ecosystems 
is by becoming vegetarians (of the 
sort mentioned ea rl ier) . Less cu Itiva­
tion is needed to feed vegetarians 
than omnivores because the animals 
eaten by omnivores must themselves 
be fed by vegetation grown on the 
land. But most of the nutritional 
value of this vegetation is used by 
the animals for their own bodies' 
maintenance. So people who eat 
plants instead of feeding them to ani­
mals can feed themselves by growing 
fewer plants and cultivating less 
land. 3 
The cultivation of land is almost 
universally detrimental to an ecosys­
tem's health. One ecosystem is 
health ier than another if it has a 
greater ability to regenerate itself. 
In the words of Aldo Leopold, "Health 
is the capacity of the land for self­
renewal. "4 The su rface of the Moon 
and Parmenides' One are paradigm 
cases of non -ecosystems. They 
incl ude neither generation nor regen­
eration. Central Illinois is typical of 
land under cultivation. A few spec­
ies, such as huma n bei ngs, corn and 
soybeans are overrepresented, while 
the general diversity of species is 
very small (compared to a wilderness 
area). The soil is eroding faster than 
it is being built (hence the massive 
use of fertilizers) and insect popula­
tions tend toward inordinate growth 
(hence the massive use of pesticides). 
The capacity for self- regeneration is 
thus very limited. Take away the 
ferti lizers, pesticides a nd herbicides, 
and the fields of corn and soybeans 
would change rapidly; they would not 
regenerate in their current form 
Healthy ecosystems may be com­
pared to healthy organisms. A 
healthy plant or animal has the power 
to regenerate itself in the context of 
the environmental conditions to which 
it is adapted by evolution. By con­
trast, an animal that is seriously ill 
may require blood transfusions, a 
respirator, and other artificial life­
support systems if it is to remain 
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alive. If it dies, the matter of which 
it is composed will continue to exist, 
but will no longer participate in the 
same system of relationsh ips that 
characterized the living organism. 
The herbicides, pesticides a nd fer­
tilizers used in Central Illinois are 
like the' artificial life-support systems 
that may be used to keep an animal 
alive. Just as the necessity of arti­
ficial life support indicates ill health 
in an or,ganism, the necessity of pes­
ticides and the like indicates ill health 
in Central Illinois' agricultural ecosys­
terns. In' both cases, ill health is 
indicated by the inability of a system 
(or organ ism) to regenerate itself. 
Central Illinois would be ecologically 
, health ier were it not fa rmed. 
The ecologically disruptive impact 
of agriculture is not due entirely to 
the use of modern agricultu ral meth­
ods. In the ancient Near East the 
emergence of agricultu re caused "the 
local extinction of large wild mammals, 
deserts replacing forests, the degra­
dation of grasslands and the disap­
pearance of soil. "5 In the Far East, 
as well, ag ricu Itu re accou nts for 
eroded slopes su rrounding ancient cit­
ies, their burial under successive lay­
ers of silt, and periodic floods and 
pestilence. Wilderness areas are 
almost universally healthier than areas 
that are farmed. 
Some land is not suitable for grow­
ing plants that humans can eat, but 
can be used to grow vegetation that 
animals can eat. People can make 
nutritional use of this land only by 
eating the animals raised upon it. 
However, this method of deliberately 
raising animals for food also degrades 
the ecosystems involved. Th~ herded 
species are overrepresented in the 
ecosystem just as is corn in central 
Illinois. So are the plant species 
upon which the herds feed. The 
general variety of animal species is 
reduced because predators are 
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eliminated to protect the flock, and 
other grazing animals are crowed out 
of the limited food supply. The man­
made machines used in the process of 
controlling and moving the herd are 
ecologically disruptive, and range 
overuse often causes ecological diffi­
culties. The result isa diminished 
capacity for self- regeneration. Just 
as a sick individual may need to have 
fluids drained from her body in an 
artificial manner, so members of the 
herded species must be eliminated by 
massive human intervention, because 
humans are the species' only preda­
tors. If human beings ignore the 
flock for a considerable period of 
time, over-grazing will denude the 
landscape. Rains will then wash away 
the topsoil, reducing floral regenera­
tion. The herd will starve for lack of 
food. They wi II be unable to regen­
erate themselves. In short, theeco­
system will die, to be replaced by 
another. 
A vegetarian population would allow 
such land to remain in the ecologically 
healthier wilderness state. Thus, 
whether animals are raised for, human 
consumption through farming or herd­
ing, people could feed themselves in a 
less ecologically disruptive manner by 
being vegetarians. Their prima facie 
obligation to reduce their negative 
impact upon and promote the health of 
ecosystems thus gives them a prima 
facie obligation to be vegetarians. 
4. It is true that alfalfa croppi ng 
enriches soils ,by adding nitrogen to 
them. Nitrogen enrichment can en­
hance an area's generative and re­
generative capacities. So one, way of 
improving the ecological health of an 
area that has nitrogen depleted soil is 
to grow alfalfa there before allowing 
the area to return to a wilderness 
state. People can make nutritional 
use of the resulting alfalfa only by 
going through the animal cycle. From 
the pu rely ecological perspective meat 
should occasionally be raised this way 
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and consumed by people. This would 
allow some of people's nutritional 
requirements to be met in a way that, 
unlike most agricultural production, is 
ecologically constructive, rather than 
destructive. The same reasoning 
supports raising animals for human, 
consumption on garbage, the waste 
from vegetable processing, and the 
like. 
But some human beings have spe­
cial medical needs for the consumption 
of meat and are therefore exempt from 
th e CLi rrent a rg ument fo r vegeta ri an­
ism. It is assumed that their physical 
health is of greater value than is the 
ecological disvalue that is typically 
caused by eating meat. Occasional 
alfalfa cropping and the like makes it 
possible to feed (many of) these peo­
ple without any ecological disvalue. 
But this does not justify anyone else 
eating meat grown deliberately for 
human consumption. 
There a re, of cou rse, objections to 
eating meat that are distinct from the 
ecological considerations raised here. 
Peter Singer objects to meat consump­
tion on utilitarian grounds,6 and Tom 
Regan on the basis of an imal rights. 7 
Any concessions made in this paper to 
the practice of eati ng meat relate 
solely to ecological considerations, and 
are not meant to imply that the prac­
tice is acceptable from the perspec­
tives of utilitarianism or animal rights. 
I am here considering the implications 
on Iy of the ecological perspective. 
Some meat is available from animals 
that have not been del iberately raised 
for human consumption. These are 
animals that have grown in the wild. 
They can be acqui red th rough ecolog­
ically benign hunting, such as that 
undertaken by many hunter-gather­
ers, and by such hunting advocates 
as Aldo Leopold and Paul Shepard. 
Such hu nting is ecologically ben ign 
because it does not detract from the 
ecosystem's ability to regenerate 
itself. However, ecologically benign 
hunting represents an insignificantly 
small percentage of the hunting con­
ducted world-wide. The small quanti­
ties of meat acquired by it should, for 
humanitarian and ecological reasons, 
be reserved for those with special 
medical problems, since alfalfa crop­
ping and the like are unlikely to be 
sufficient for thei r needs. 
An exception should be made in 
this regard for some contemporary 
hunter-gatherers. Thei r entl re way 
of Iife depends upon the (ecologically 
benign) hunt meeting some of their 
nutritional needs. The loss they 
would experience by becoming vegeta­
rians, like that of people with special 
medical problems, is more than can be 
justified by the ecological good that 
their vegetarianism would do. 
Some fishing could be ecologically 
benign and result in large catches, 
though at present little fishing is 
conducted in this manner. But if a 
great deal were, healthy people would 
be able to eat some fish, but probably 
much less than at present. (Again, 
this is the case when the issue is 
viewed solely from the ecological per­
spective. ) 
5. Some people might be surprised 
to learn that vegetarianism is ecologi­
cally better than omnivorous eating, 
because they thin k that if everyone 
became a vegeta ria n, the world wou Id 
be populated by increasing hordes of 
cows, hogs and chickens, who would 
plague humanity and cause ecological 
disaster. However, this fear is ill­
fou nded. ,Fa rmers cu rrently control 
the size of their flocks and so would 
be able to reduce them appropriately 
as the demand for meat diminished. 
But most species need not become 
extinct, either. Some of thei r mem­
bers could probably be returned to 
suitable wilderness areas (after suffi­
cient resea rch, so as to avoid such 
ecological disruption as that caused by 
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burros in the Grand Canyon, mus­
tangs in Wyoming and camels in the 
California desert). 
The fact that omnivorous diets are 
ecologically destructive does not imply 
that all vegetarian diets are ecologi­
cally benign. It is, for example, eco­
logically damaging to raise tomatoes 
and pineapples monoculturally. But 
this does not diminish one's prima 
facie obligation to be a vegetarian. It 
means merely that being a vegetarian 
does not discharge completely one's 
prima facie obligation to reduce one's 
negative impact upon and promote the 
health of ecosystems. The obligation 
requires (prima facie) that we alter 
many aspects of our lives, in areas as 
diverse as transportation, recreation 
and fami Iy plan ning. But the poi nt of 
the present paper is that we are 
required to become vegetarians. 
If the arguments above are cor­
rect, I have so fa r shown that people 
have a prima facie obligation to be 
vegetarians, and that this obligation 
is not overrridden by very slight 
inconveniences to the agent. I will 
now show that except for those with 
special health problems, people have 
an obligation pure and simple, one 
that is not prima facie, to become 
vegeta rian s. 
For healthy people, no loss in 
nutrition or health need accompany a 
change to a vegetarian diet. There 
will be some loss in gustatory pleas­
u re, but th is need be no more than 
temporary. Delicious vegetarian meals 
can be made as easily, and often more 
inexpensively, than the dishes they 
replace. Thus, the major ob~tacle to 
becoming a vegetarian is the trouble 
associated with abandoning old pat­
terns of behavior and adopting new 
ones. Th is inconvenience is consider­
able, but tempora ry, lasti ng on Iy a 
matter of months, at most. If one can 
remain a vegetarian for many years, 
then the bu rden of becomi ng one is 
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smaller per unit of time during which 
one can be a vegetarian, than is the 
ecological benefit per unit of time of a 
vegetarian over an omnivorous diet. 
This is because each day a person is 
a vegetarian, the strain that his or 
her food consumption puts on the bio­
sphere is cut by more than one-half. 8 
Because individuals differ, no one 
can be certain that his or her long­
term experience of loss wi II not be 
very great. But the testimony of 
those who have al ready become vege­
tarians gives everyone very good evi­
dence that in the long ru n bei ng a 
vegeta ria n involves very Iittleloss. 
So everyone has an obi igation, wh ich 
is not prima facie, to at least become 
a vegetarian, and remain so long 
enough for the formation of habits 
that have for other people made vege­
tarianism convenient and esthetically 
pleasu rable. 
The val ue of healthy ecosystems 
does not diminish the value of human 
well-being, so the consequences for 
the general level of human well-being 
of a massive shift shift to vegetarian­
ism must be assessed. These conse­
quences are mostly positive. It would 
be easier and less expensive to feed a 
vegetarian than an omnivorous popula­
tion. Thus, we would all gain at the 
supermarket. More important, it 
would be easier to eliminate malnutri­
tion and starvation among human 
bei ngs as nutritiou s food was pro­
duced more efficiently. (Of cou rse, 
this does not by itself guarantee that 
the poor would actually be fed.) The 
improved ecosystems resu Iti ng from 
vegetarianism could be of recreational, 
esthetic and scientific benefit to peo­
ple. 
On the negative side, the meat 
industry would be ruined, creating 
ha rdsh ips for those who depend upon 
it for income. There is however, a 
general bel ief in ou r society that the 
commercial hardships created by 
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changing consumption patterns are 
more than compensated for by the 
benefits associated with such changes. 
Thus, we do not censure those who 
are voluntarily buying small, fuel-ef­
ficient cars, even though this creates 
difficulties in the auto industry. We 
do not look back with moral disdain 
upon those who chose eighty years 
ago to light thei r homes with electric­
ity, rather than gas. We have no 
more reason to question the moral 
propriety of a change to vegetarian­
ism. Indeed, we "have less, due to 
the obviously great human benefits to 
be derived from the change, and to 
the fact that the change is called for 
by the obligations to minimize the 
ha rm one does to ecosystems a nd to 
promote thei r health. 
6. J. Baird Callicott, in his gener­
ally excellent article "Animal Libera­
tion: A Triangular Affair, "9 maintains 
that the earth's biosphere is best 
protected by people remaining omni­
vores rather than becoming vegetari­
ans. One's prima facie obligation to 
reduce one's negative impact upon and 
promote the health of ecosystems 
would thus require that one continue 
eating meat. Callicott does not dis­
sent from the view urged here that, 
all other things being equal, vegeta­
rian humans are lesser burdens on the 
biosphere than their omnivorous 
counterparts. He notes, however, 
that vegetarianism 
"increases available food 
resou rces for human beings. 
The human population would 
probably, as past trends over­
whelmingly suggest, expand in 
accordance with the potential 
thus afforded. The net result 
would be fewer nonhuman 
beings and more human beings 
who, of course, have require­
ments of life far more elaborate 
than even those of domestic 
animals, requirements which 
wou Id tax other 'natu ra I 
resources' (trees for shelter, 
minerals mined at the expense 
of topsoi I and its vegetation, 
etc.) more than under present 
ci rcumstances. A vegeta rian 
human population is therefore 
probably ecologically cata­
strophic. "(emphasis in original) 
The first thing to note is that the 
a rgument here is not that general 
vegetarianism would be ecologically 
catastrophic, but that an increased 
human population would be so, which 
is of course correct. So Callicott is 
not denying the ecological advantages 
of the prescriptions that people both 
stop eating meat and stabilize or" 
decrease their population. 
He maintains, however, on the 
basis of "past trends" (he might have 
invoked Malthus, as well) that the 
human population tends to expand in 
accordance with the food available to 
people. Following the first prescrip­
tion, vegetarianism, thus makes it 
unlikely that people will follow the 
second, population stabilization or 
reduction. But the Malthusian pre­
diction is surely ill-founded. Contem­
porary industrial and post-industrial 
societies (i.e. Western Europe, Japan 
and the United States) illustrate 
almost universally that an increased 
availability of food, whether created 
by altered agricultural practices or by 
ag ricu Itu ral imports pa id for with 
manufactured goods, need not be 
accompanied by population increase. 
The populations in these countries are 
either leveling off, stable or declining 
slightly. Is there any reason to think 
that if food became increasingly avail­
able due not to increased agricultural 
or industrial output, but because peo­
ple became vegetarians, that the 
effect on population would be any dif­
ferent? I see none. Quite to the 
contrary, if people were so moved by 
the ecological argument presented here 
as to change their eating habits, the 
last thing one would expect them to 
do is apply the money they save on 
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food to the birth and rearing of a 
child they would not otherwise have 
had. So the con nection between veg­
etarianism and population increase 
upon which Callicott's argument turns 
is factually ill-founded and psycholog­
ically implausible. 
Reliance upon a Malthusian assump­
tion about human behavior is inappro­
priate in an argument against vegeta­
rianism for yet another reason. 
Suppose the assumption were correct, 
that people could be relied upon to 
increase thei r population so as to fu lIy 
use their food production potential. 
Twentieth centu ry tech nology has 
made that potential so great that the 
correspondi ng popu lation increase 
wou Id be great enough to lead to 
nothing short of world-wide ecological 
disaster. All roads W0U Id lead to 
perdition. Whether people were vege­
tarians or omnivores, whether indus­
try were powered by solar energy or 
nuclear energy, whether there were 
disarmament or a continued armS race, 
popu lation increase wou Id destroy the 
biosphere. The danger of ecological 
disaster would, therefore, not serve 
to favor anyone cou rse of action over 
its opposite, and so would not favor 
either an omnivorous or a vegetarian 
diet over the other. Thus, even 
when his Malthusian assumption is 
granted, Callicott does not present a 
cogent argument against vegetarian­
ism. 
Finally, Callicott raises a consider­
ation which does not so much argue 
against vegetarianism as denigrate its 
importance. He writes in relation to 
the horror that an inial liberation ists 
have of factory farming, 
liThe land ethic takes as much 
exception [to] (sic) the trans­
mogrification of plants by 
mechanicochemical means as to 
Peter S. 
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that of animals. The important 
thing, I would think, is not to 
eat vegetables as opposed to 
animal flesh, but to resist 
factory farming in all its mani­
festations, including especially 
its liberal application of pesti­
cides, herbicides, and chemical 
fertilizers to maximize the pro­
duction of vegetable crops." 
The ecological perspective of the 
present paper supports this call to eat 
"organically as opposed to mechanico­
chemically produced food," because 
pesticides, herbicides and chemical 
fertilizers damage the biosphere 
greatly. But this in no way dimin­
ishes the moral importance, from the 
same ecological perspective, of avoid­
ing the consumption of meat.; Pres­
ently, most of the meat consumed in 
our society is produced by feeding 
animals mechanicocheniically produced 
grains. Cutting these animals out of 
the human food chain would therefore 
drastically reduce the mechanicochemi­
cal production of vegetables. Second, 
current food production methodSs are 
used, as Callicott notes, be~ause they 
"maximize the production of vegetable 
crops." Maki ng the transition that he 
and I both advocate to organ ic vege­
table production will result in a food 
shortage unless the relative "ineffi­
ciency" of organic farming is compen­
sated for by some additional efficiency 
elsewhere. So long as the human 
population is over two or three bil­
Iion, wh ich mea nsin the foreseeable 
future, vegetarianism will be needed 
to create additional efficiency in the 
human food chain in order to make the 
transition to organic agriculture feasi­
ble. So contrary to Callicott's view, 
the importance of eliminating the 
mechanicochemical production of vege­
tables strengthens rather than weak­
ens the ecological argument for vege­
tarianism. 
Wenz 
Sangarnon State University, Illinois 
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